Discussing
Brittany Maynard and 9/11 jumpers: an analogy that doesn’t work

Comparing Brittany Maynard to 9/11 jumpers is misguided, and Thomas Aquinas' view of moral actions and free choice can help us see why.

It seems to me that there's quite a big difference between someone jumping from the second story and the two hundredth, even taking the DDE into account: from the second story we can hope to survive, even if it's by no means a sure thing, but from the two hundredth, does anyone think they'd actually survive that? The 9/11 jumpers seemed more motivated by substituting a quick death with a drawn-out one, or perhaps a death on their own terms. I really don't see any hope of their surviving there.

I haven't had the time to read up on her case so I don't know exactly how Britanny Maynard died. I do know that many Catholic bioethicists rely on Aquinas's distinction here to distinguish between active and passive suicide. For instance, if you know that further chemo won't restore health but will only prolong discomfort some bioethicists would argue that you're allowed to refuse further treatment - even knowing it will bring death on more quickly. That's the problem with DDE in my book: the line between intended action and perfectly predictable but not intended has always been so murky, to the point that it seems to be too flexible.

I'm not saying Brittany should have killed herself. For me it depends quite a bit on how imminent death is, and that seems to be the real difference between the 9/11 jumpers and a case of assisted suicide: there's a lot of differences between minutes more life in horrible pain and months of steady decline in which a person might experience some quality of life. I can react with mercy to someone making the former tradeoff (though I'm not sure I can call it right), but in the latter it seems like death is not unavoidable yet, and so she does have more of a choice to make.

Marta, thanks for your thoughtful comments. I agree that there is a big difference between jumping from the second story and the two hundredth in terms of foreseeable consequences. I don't think any of the 9/11 jumpers thought they could or would survive. What I'm wrestling with is how to articulate their primary intention. In some ways, it seems to me that staying in the building would be analogous to suicide, whereas the attempt to prolong life (even for seconds) would be analogous to letting the disease take its course. I suppose the question is whether we're focusing on the pain aspect or the temporal aspect of the analogy.

I agree with the distinction between active suicide and choosing to forego treatments when they involve an undue burden, but I wouldn't call the foregoing of treatment (in those cases) "suicide." The cause of death in that case is the disease.

I agree that there are issues with DDE, especially in terms of predictability. In some ways, it lends further weight to the case against suicide, I think. In advocating for the individual right to die and taking her own life, Maynard is not merely making an individual decision. What she did may influence others who are not dealing with the same kind of terminal and untreatable disease to go ahead and take their own life. If there's anything that's certain, it's that our choices never affect only us.

I'm not going to be popular for saying this, but I actually think that there's a lot to be said for Corey's analogy, even if I don't reach the same conclusions he does. Make no mistake: I have tremendous sympathy for the victims in both circumstances. In both cases we find innocent people suffering unjustly--even cruelly so. I guess I'm just not as eager to split hairs over the difference between the situations, even though there are significant differences. For me the issue is much simpler, even if the ramifications are complex indeed.

See, my Bible reveals the unsavory (and very, very politically incorrect) truth that neither the 9/11 jumpers nor those dying of terminal cancer are truly "innocent," at least not in God's eternal perspective. Both are casualties of sin. Perhaps not their own immediate sins, but of sin nevertheless. There is a real sense in which both "deserve" to die...and that God should see fit to spare any of us sinners the cruel fate these individuals endured is a tremendous demonstration of grace.

But that's also where, without passing any personal judgment upon those individuals, I have to conclude that the "choice" to die is inevitably a concession to sin. Because I serve a risen Lord who, through his own unjust suffering, conquered sin and summons me to follow, I conclude that my life is not my own. It belongs to the One who bought it back from death. And that means my calling is to live (in Him), whether we're speaking of the terrifying next 2 seconds, an agonizing few hours, or a cruelly tortuous several years. It means I'm called to live, whether God sees fit for me to suffer the consequences of sin in my life--mine or others--or to be mercifully spared. It means, in a word, that my life is missional.

I'm not trying to make an emotionally and ethically complex decision sound simplistic. Please, readers, don't hear this as a pat religious dismissal of the motivations of the jumpers or the "death with dignity" principle. It's not. It's absolutely not. And if I should--God forbid--find myself or one of my loved ones in the same impossible situation, I'm not sure that I would have the strength to behave differently.

But I do believe that there's something inherently false about the "dignity" of dying "on our own terms." I think those who defiantly live where death beckons most seductively, relying on the Spirit for the strength and courage to do so, are incredible, transformative witnesses to Christ's resurrection power.

Great Spirit-led thoughts on this. I'm still struggling with my own thoughts on the topic. But this discussion is definitely helping me sort through it all.

Not an easy subject.

JKana, thanks for your thoughts on this matter. I agree the central theological point here is that we are not our own but belong to God. We don't have the authority to actively end our own lives.

I also agree that our dignity comes not from our choice but from receiving the gift of life, a gift we did not choose and do not have absolute control over at ANY time of our lives.

However, I wouldn't consider the effort here one of mere "hair-splitting." The distinctions here become particularly important for those involved in hospice and palliative care. How does "defiantly living where death beckons most seductively" apply to those nearing the end of life from a disease running its course or simply someone deteriorating of natural causes? I think some Christians mistakenly think that the Christian position is that we absolutely fight for every breath, so long as there is a heartbeat or brain activity. This is sometimes called 'vitalism' and I think it actually gives TOO much power to death; it says we have to fight death tooth and nail no matter what. Christians should recognize, I think, that letting go of someone (including ourselves) who is in this position is morally permissible and appropriate. That's where I'd want to keep some of this more complex distinctions. They do make a difference.